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Abstract Urban redevelopment projects implemented through public-
private partnerships are the preferred way to revitalize inner-city
areas. As the numbers of participants increase and deal structures
become more complex, participants need more detailed
knowledge of one another’s motivations and behaviors to achieve
feasible redevelopment projects. This research describes the
expectations and behaviors of private sources of debt and equity,
especially their ﬁnancial return requirements, and the actions
public participants can take to reduce project risks. With this
knowledge, lead public and private participants should be able
to forge economically viable projects that generate greater public
beneﬁts while reducing the risks of urban redevelopment.
Introduction
For many years, metropolitan economic activity has been decentralizing, and
central cities and inner-ring suburbs have lost employment and population
relatively and often absolutely. Central city decline is associated with a host of
social, economic and political problems. In response, public policy has favored
the physical renewal and economic revitalization of inner-city areas. Urban
redevelopment projects have been the favored vehicles for inner-city revitalization.
For the past several decades, mobilizing public-private partnerships has been the
preferred approach to implement urban redevelopment. Local governments,
community-based organizations, foundations, neighborhood groups and other
community advocates represent the public. Real estate developers and investors,
commercial bankers, and tenants or their brokers represent the private sector. The
focus of these efforts has been ﬁnding ways to lower risks or increase returns to
private participants in order to attract investment capital to redevelopment projects.
To secure private capital, the public participants have primarily sought ways to
attract commercial lenders and other private sources of debt capital by lowering
their ﬁnancial risk. Since the late 1970s, the gap ﬁnancing model has evolved to
lower ﬁnancial risk through subordinated ﬁnancing, ﬁxed and below-market464  Malizia
interest rates, ﬂexible repayment schedules, and guarantees or other forms of credit
enhancement provided by socially-oriented lenders (Meeker, 1996; and Malizia,
1997). Less attention has been devoted to risk reduction intended to attract private
equity capital. Although private and community-based real estate developers can
provide some equity, they are rarely willing or able to fund the equity position
fully. Furthermore, public policy has changed dramatically since the mid 1980s.
Depreciation schedules, loss provisions, income tax rates and capital gains
treatment have reduced signiﬁcantly the tax-shelter beneﬁts of real estate
ownership. Tax credits for low-income housing, historic preservation and the New
Markets initiative rely on the tax code to attract private equity to socially beneﬁcial
projects. In most instances, however, socially beneﬁcial urban redevelopment
projects must be both economically viable and ﬁnancially feasible if private equity
and debt are to be secured on reasonable terms.
The other major change since the 1980s has been greater project complexity.
Urban redevelopment projects now involve more actors on both the public and
private side. In many cities, the lead role of representing the community has
shifted from the public sector to the non-proﬁt sector, a change that has paralleled
the growing importance of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in
international development. Community-based organizations, in particular,
community development corporations (CDCs), have become the champions of
public-private redevelopment projects. Community developers and planners
participate on behalf of local elected ofﬁcials that represent the public at large.
Many CDCs bring local, regional or national foundations to the table with
program-related investments, thereby broadening the base of available ﬁnancial
support. On the private side, real estate developers, local investors and commercial
banks still participate as project leaders and as sources of equity and debt.
However, they are often joined or replaced by other private actors that include
commercial bank CDCs, specialized real estate investment trusts (REITs) and
major tenants that assume an ownership position in the project. The simple deal
structure involving private developer/owner, private lender and public source of
ﬁnancing has become much less common than deal structures that involve twice
that many actors or even more.
As the group of participants grows larger and moves beyond the familiar ground
of tax-credit housing or historic projects and becomes involved in more complex
commercial ventures, it needs to move up the learning curve. Participants
especially need more detailed knowledge of the current motivations and behaviors
of private lenders and equity investors interested in commercial redevelopment
projects (Porter, 1995; Carr, 1999; and Williams, 1999). With this knowledge, lead
participants should be able to forge partnerships that generate greater public
beneﬁts while reducing the risks of urban redevelopment.
The research procedures and ﬁndings presented here are designed to increase the
understanding of the expectations and behaviors of private investors, especially
their ﬁnancial return requirements. The next section reviews the research approach.
The subsequent section summarizes the research hypotheses and ﬁndings.Structuring Urban Redevelopment Projects  465
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The fourth section further elaborates on and draws implications from the results.
The concluding section offers directions for future research.
 Research Methods
Very little research has focused on the motivations, behaviors or return
requirements of private actors ﬁnancing redevelopment projects, especially equity
investors. Adair, McGreal, Deddis and Hirst (1999) conducted research on the
behaviors of private investors that participated in British redevelopment projects.
Gyourko and Rybczynski (2000) surveyed investors to determine their
expectations and investment criteria when ﬁnancing new urbanism projects. Meyer
and Lyons (2000) reported declining return requirements of private investors as
they learned more about brownﬁeld projects. Jackson (2001) surveyed private
lenders and equity investors more systematically and found them increasingly able
to gauge environmental risk.
The research approach evident in this literature involves primarily qualitative
surveys based on convenience samples of participants. Why not take a more
rigorous objective approach that would lead to descriptive or causal inferences?
Why not randomly sample recently completed commercial redevelopment projects
and their sponsors to gather the information? Four reasons justify the approach
represented in the literature cited above and followed here. First, no practical,
cost-effective way exists to identify the populations of investors, developers or
lenders involved in urban redevelopment. Surveying projects, randomly selected
or not, does not adequately represent the population of private participants.
Individual investors are particularly difﬁcult to ﬁnd since most participate through
third parties, like local attorneys, who operate via informal channels.
Second and more importantly, research focused on redevelopment projects
intended to generate externally valid results would fail to be internally valid. More
can be learned about private expectations, motivations and return requirements by
taking account of the larger set of potential projects considered by investors than
the ones they actually pursued. The only way to consider this larger set of realized
or unrealized projects is to focus on the private investors and lenders themselves.
This focus on participants is also more efﬁcient because a much larger, more
varied set of implemented and unimplemented projects can be considered.
Therefore, the private participants themselves should be surveyed even if the
samples are not fully representative.
Third, private participants responding to surveys have few reasons to provide
accurate information about their actual motivations and behavior. Commercial
bankers are well aware of CRA afﬁrmative lending requirements and are not very
interested in talking speciﬁcally about their motivations and lending criteria.
Developers and investors have their money and reputations at stake. They have
no incentive to be forthcoming with speciﬁc information about their investment
practices that could expose them to criticism. In this context, private participants466  Malizia
are motivated to provide general and vague responses instead of the clear and
speciﬁc answers that are sought.
Finally, the speciﬁcity of the information sought largely determines the extent to
which results can be generalized. For example, although real estate market analysts
may want to know how many people will live in an area in ﬁve or ten years,
demographers cannot provide such forecasts except with rather broad error ranges.
Demographic and economic analysis can help market analysts understand whether
an area is likely to grow or stagnate. In the context of this research, the hypothesis
that investors require higher returns when they perceive higher risk can be tested
empirically with expert surveys. But one should not try to generalize about the
level of return required because general knowledge does not exist on this point.
The level of return depends on the speciﬁc investor’s risk tolerance, the speciﬁc
project under consideration, alternative local and non-local investments
opportunities, and the general state of capital markets. Similarly, the hypothesis
that commercial lenders ration credit towards proﬁtable, lower risk projects can
be tested. But, the speciﬁc approach, underwriting criteria and ﬁnancial ratios
applied will vary with the project, the participants, the location and the timing of
the project.
Research Strategy
How can speciﬁc and clear information be obtained from private participants? The
researcher must have some reasonable entre ´e with them to get accurate
information. Cold calls to private lenders and equity investors would not be
worthwhile even if random samples could be drawn. The researcher must invest
time in relationship building to generate the necessary trust. Direct discussions
can lead to useful ﬁndings when respondents are comfortable with the researcher,
the context and the uses of the research. Prior research suggests that properly
oriented experts can offer thoughtful, accurate and honest information about the
ﬁnancing of redevelopment, New Urbanism or brownﬁeld projects (Adair,
McGreal, Deddis and Hirst 1999; Grourko and Rybczynski, 2000; and Jackson,
2001).
Three venues were used to gather and synthesize information on the research
questions: (1) workshops with redevelopment project participants; (2) focus groups
with these same expert sources; and (3) follow-up telephone interviews with some
of these experts and with others who have not participated in redevelopment in
low-wealth areas. In May 1999, a workshop was conducted in North Carolina for
twenty-nine participants with experience in inner-city commercial redevelopment.
In May 2001, another one was conducted in Virginia with a similar group of
twenty-seven participants. The participants included real estate developers,
commercial lenders, major tenant representatives, CDC directors, city planners and
community developers, and community advocates, among others as shown in
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Exhibit 1  Workshop Participants
North Carolina Participants, May 1999.
1. CDC executive directors: Greensboro, Charlotte, Rocky Mount, Durham and Wilson (5).
2. Community Development Department directors: Greensboro, Raleigh, Winston-Salem, Charlotte
and Durham (5).
3. Commercial real estate developers—small scale speculative development in the southeast, head-
quartered in Chapel Hill, Raleigh, Greensboro and Charlotte (5).
4. Commercial leasing and tenant representation with clients in Durham, Raleigh and Greensboro
(4).
5. Commercial bankers: Bank of America, BB&T, Centura Bank and First Union Bank (4).
6. Community development banking representatives (3).
7. Non-proﬁt real estate developers including Wachovia Community Development Corporation (2).
8. Local attorney representing real estate investors (1).
Virginia Participants, May 2001.
1. CDC executive directors from Lynchburg, Norfolk and Richmond (4).
2. Community Development Department directors from Newport News, Norfolk, Richmond, Vir-
ginia Beach and state level administrators (6).
3. Commercial and residential real estate developers (4).
4. Non-proﬁt real estate developers (2).
5. Commercial bankers: Bank of America, BB&T, First Union, Sun Trust and Wachovia (6).
6. Local Initiative Support Corporation (LISC) executive (2).
7. City manager.
8. Local city councilwoman.
9. Community development banking representative.
Overall Composition of Respondents (N  62)
Private real estate developer: 16%
Commercial banker: 16%
Other private-sector representatives: 16%
Community development lenders and non-proﬁt sector representatives: 16%
CDC executive director: 15%
Public-sector professionals or ofﬁcials: 21%
of these groups were convened. Each group used the same case study of a
hypothetical commercial redevelopment project to explore ways to increase private
equity investment without diminishing the social beneﬁts that the project was
designed to realize (Malizia, 1999). After lunch, one representative of each group
reported the group’s solutions to all participants. In the afternoon sessions, four
focus groups each representing real estate developers, commercial lenders,
representatives of community-based CDCs or public sector professionals were
convened. Each group considered a set of working hypotheses about urban
redevelopment projects. The participants appeared to provide honest information
in part because they had no ﬁnancial or political capital at stake in responding to
the questions.468  Malizia
Facilitators ran the morning and afternoon sessions, and note takers kept track of
the discussion. The sessions were not tape-recorded, which increased the comfort
level of the participants. Furthermore, individual responses were treated as
conﬁdential.
Telephone interviews were subsequently conducted with some of these
participants. In addition, six real estate developers and investors that did not
participate in urban redevelopment were identiﬁed and contacted. These interviews
were used to clarify ambiguous points and to highlight important private-sector
concerns. The draft report was written and circulated to all participants for ﬁnal
review and comment.
Although the research was conducted carefully and included checks to corroborate
results, the research methods employed are qualitative and therefore suffer from
inherent limitations. Group membership is highly selective, not representative.
Workshop participants gained most of their recent experience in the southeast;
most have not done projects outside of this region. Actual experience in urban
redevelopment projects varied considerably, especially among the public
participants. Still, over sixty participants expressed various opinions but ultimately
were able to achieve near consensus on almost all issues. They generated speciﬁc
results that have practical importance to the participants of urban redevelopment
projects. Furthermore, the research pursued the important task of determining the
views of private lenders and investors about participation in future redevelopment
projects. (Since this research was largely completed before September 11, 2001
the potential impact of these events on urban redevelopment ﬁnancing could not
be assessed.)
 Research Hypotheses and Results
The working hypotheses were formulated primarily from descriptions of actual
public-private projects (for example, see publications of the Federal Reserve
Banks’ Community Affairs Ofﬁces), references on development ﬁnance used to
train CDFIs personnel (for example, see Parzen and Kieschnick, 1992), and
personal experience acquired through involvement in such projects (see Malizia,
1997; and Stainback, 2000). They address the related areas of valuation,
development lending and development investing. In essence, the hypotheses apply
and adapt the risk-reward framework to the domain of urban redevelopment
projects. The results of this research add depth and speciﬁc content to generally
accepted knowledge based on agreement among the participants.
Valuation
Hypothesis I. Risk is higher for redevelopment projects in distressed areas than
for similar suburban development projects for three primary reasons: market risk
is perceived to be higher in distressed areas than in the suburbs, the capital budgetStructuring Urban Redevelopment Projects  469
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is more difﬁcult to estimate for redevelopment sites compared to greenﬁeld sites
and expectations of future conditions in central cities and core areas are more
variable than expectations about suburban conditions.
The participants easily accepted this hypothesis. The only contentious issue
pertained to entitlement risk. One view was that entitlements were easier to
achieve in the suburbs where procedures were simpler and compliance less costly.
The other view, which was held by a majority of participants, was that entitlements
were gained more easily in distressed areas ‘‘hungry’’ for growth compared to
suburban areas that often had organized neighborhood opposition to further growth
(NIMBY forces). Overall, project risk in distressed areas was still higher than in
growing suburban areas because market risk and other types of risk were higher
in spite of lower entitlement risk.
Hypothesis II. Real estate appraisers would apply higher capitalization rates to
redevelopment projects compared to similar development projects in suburban
areas to reﬂect higher risk.
Participants agreed with this hypothesis. They cited examples where they had used
higher capitalization rates. They agreed that market analysts and appraisers use
higher capitalization rates to reﬂect expectations of greater variance in future cash
ﬂows.
Hypothesis III. The selected market-determined capitalization rate should be
consistent with the related yield capitalization rate. These rates can be used to
relate current and expected market conditions to investors’ assessments of risk-
adjusted returns.
By making assumptions about typical lending terms, one can derive a yield
capitalization rate consistent with the overall capitalization rate (WACC approach).
The participants did not follow this logic because they did not use appraisal
methods in practice. Instead, they often used different measures of return and
preferred either a simple cash-on-cash return analysis or discounted cash ﬂow
analysis to examine expected returns. Since real estate appraisers were not
participants, no dialogue was possible on this hypothesis. It deserves further
attention in future empirical research on this topic.
Development Lending
Commercial bankers and bankers representing community development ﬁnancial
institutions (CDFIs) were the main sources of informed opinion about these three
hypotheses.
Hypothesis IV. Lenders apply lower loan-to-value ratios (or lower loan-to-cost
ratios) when underwriting redevelopment projects compared to similar suburban
development projects because lower leverage partly compensates for higher risk.
In theory, lenders are expected to ration credit. Rather than charge higher interest
rates on riskier loans, they prefer to provide a lower proportion of the ﬁnancing470  Malizia
at the same interest rate as would be charged similar projects in other locations.
See Wood and Wood (1985: 517–34) for a further discussion of credit rationing
as a way to manage the overall risk level of loan portfolios. In practice, however,
lenders prefer to achieve more conservative underwriting through credit rationing
indirectly to avoid the charge of redlining. Lenders are not inclined to add risk
premiums to capitalization rates that would lower project value solely on the basis
of the project’s location. Such geographically-based action, however justiﬁed,
could be hard to defend and possibly raise questions of discriminatory lending.
Instead of project value, the lenders agreed that they prefer to focus on the
project’s expected cash ﬂow. In comparison to stronger projects, the
redevelopment project’s NOI estimates are likely to be lower and/or more variable.
Higher debt-service coverage ratios are therefore warranted. These higher coverage
ratios place limits on loan size. Proportionately smaller loans result in lower loan-
to-value ratios or loan-to-cost ratios.
Hypothesis V. Lenders often lower market risk by requiring pre-lease agreements
from credit anchor/major tenants or pre-sales to prospective residents. More
conservative underwriting should result in debt coverage ratios that are
comparable to or greater than ratios for suburban projects.
Participants agreed that lenders seek pre-leasing and strong credit tenants. They
noted the greater difﬁculty of achieving these results in urban redevelopment
projects. This outcome is another manifestation of greater market risk (Hypothesis
I). Participants supported the logic of higher debt coverage ratios to provide more
cushion for urban redevelopment projects during the critical early years of
operation.
Hypothesis VI. Commercial lenders seek to lower risk by exercising effective
control of urban redevelopment projects. They provide the required debt and can
also offer the required equity through their CDC subsidiary to gain this control.
Participants soundly criticized this hypothesis and argued instead that lenders
lower risk by lowering their exposure. They much prefer tapping multiple sources
of debt and participating in loan pools to ﬁnance redevelopment projects. The lead
lender can exercise adequate control without providing all of the needed ﬁnancing.
Therefore, the following proposition was substituted for the sixth hypothesis.
Commercial lenders seek to limit their exposure by involving other private and
public sources of capital in project ﬁnancing.
Development Investing
Hypothesis VII. Private investors consider redevelopment projects riskier than
comparable suburban projects and therefore require higher returns.
Like the second hypothesis, participants readily agreed with this one. Urban
redevelopment projects are deﬁnitely considered riskier than projects in growing
areas.Structuring Urban Redevelopment Projects  471
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Hypothesis VIII. Compared to suburban projects, private investors consider lower
leverage on redevelopment projects, which lowers the lender’s ﬁnancial risk, as a
disadvantage, since more equity is required. For any given amount of risk capital,
more equity invested per project implies less diversiﬁcation since fewer projects
can be funded.
Commercial real estate developers said that available equity should be leveraged
with available debt capital to own as many projects as possible. Spreading
available equity over many projects lowers risk. Urban redevelopment projects are
doubly less attractive from this perspective. They are individually more risky and
collectively lead to less diversiﬁcation.
Hypothesis IX. Private investors are as concerned about the return of capital as
the return on capital in redevelopment projects and therefore seek clear exit
strategies and ways to reduce their holding period.
Participating real estate developers argued that they develop an exit strategy before
committing to redevelopment projects. They recognize that urban redevelopment
projects are less liquid because their markets are thinner than ones in growing
areas. They seek ways to reduce their holding period.
Hypothesis X. Private developers and investors sometimes sacriﬁce returns or
assume greater risks because they identify with redevelopment projects. They
receive non-pecuniary rewards instead.
Participants did not support this hypothesis. The public participants were
particularly vocal in saying that redevelopment projects must ‘‘pencil out’’ before
private developers and investors would consider them seriously.
Hypothesis XI. Community-based and social (foundation) sources of capital are
often needed to complete the funding of redevelopment projects. These sources
structure their participation primarily to attract private debt capital and
secondarily to recapture value for the community.
Participants agreed that ﬁnancing was an important aspect of public participation
in public-private projects. Whether trying to secure private equity or applying the
more traditional gap ﬁnancing approach to attract private debt, these sources
respond primarily to private participants. More recently, they have been asked to
structure project ﬁnancing to create opportunities for existing residents and
community-based organizations to capture some of the value generated from urban
redevelopment. Although a worthwhile goal, their priority remains on attracting
private investors to implement redevelopment projects.
 Elaboration
This section presents several additional insights offered about urban
redevelopment projects from the private debt and equity perspective. Then, it472  Malizia
offers strategies for public participants on the basis of private expectations and
behaviors described in this section and in the previous one.
Private Expectations and Behaviors
Lenders and other sources of debt capital underwrite urban redevelopment projects
more conservatively than suburban projects and commit less debt capital to these
projects. In addition to lowering ﬁnancial risk through more conservative
underwriting, commercial lenders try to lower their ﬁnancial exposure further by
involving other private participants, including their CDC subsidiary. Although
initially motivated by CRA, commercial bank CDCs have acquired the expertise
needed to understand the strengths and weaknesses of commercial redevelopment
projects and can identify economically viable ones. Commercial bank CDCs
usually have the contacts needed to bring public and private ﬁnancing sources
together for redevelopment projects. For a related discussion of development
lending, see Jackson (2001).
Commercial lenders cannot easily lower their exposure further because urban
redevelopment projects are complex due to their uniqueness and multiple sources
of ﬁnancing. This complexity makes it difﬁcult to tap secondary capital markets.
Although secondary markets for tax-credit housing projects have existed for some
time, such markets have been slow to develop for commercial projects. The Local
Initiative Support Corporation’s retail initiative (TRI) acts as a secondary market
for certain commercial projects. Formed with the goal of investing in inner-city
commercial real estate projects and backed by a number of strong ﬁnancial
institutions, Urban America, L.P. aspires to become an equity take-out for inner-
city developments. Several REITs are also specializing in inner-city commercial
projects and tapping secondary markets for equity capital. As the size and strength
of inner-city markets become more apparent to investors, more such investment
partnerships are likely to form and gradually build a secondary market for inner-
city commercial equity and debt.
With respect to equity capital, investors consider the timing of equity infusions as
important as the amount of equity required and holding period in determining
return requirements. Unlike investments in fully leased properties, redevelopment
requires funds before any space is available for lease. Risks associated with the
pre-development period, the construction period and the lease-up period are
relatively high and must be compensated with higher returns. For example, tax-
credit investors who infuse equity late in the development process, after
construction and substantial leasing have been completed, receive lower returns
than those who invest earlier in the process. Developers try to ﬁnance front-end
costs and cover the construction loan guarantee. When outside investors are asked
to infuse equity during early stages of the project or provide the balance sheet
that is used to guarantee the construction loan, their equity return requirements
can escalate considerably.Structuring Urban Redevelopment Projects  473
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Equity investors reduce their holding period and ﬁnancial exposure through
reﬁnancing. If the redevelopment project is successful, it should generate more
NOI and before-tax cash ﬂow over time, which should increase project value. As
debt service reduces the principal balance of the loan, equity builds in the project.
Project owners can usually reﬁnance the higher-valued project at a higher loan-
to-value ratio than the ratio used for the original loan. As a result, the owners
receive the portion of the reﬁnancing left after the principal balance of the original
loan is paid, which reduces their ﬁnancial exposure both in amount and time
period.
Strategies for Public Participants
Central city jurisdictions should try to lower perceived market and ﬁnancial risk
in inner-city neighborhoods to catalyze the redevelopment process. They should
develop and steadfastly implement small-area revitalization plans, improve
infrastructure selectively, increase project scale, cluster development around strong
neighborhood anchors, use triage when necessary and promote competition. With
respect to the ﬁrst option, physical plans have always served as a framework to
guide subsequent development. As a risk reduction technique, small-area planning
is critical in order to reduce the number of alternative futures that could pertain
to speciﬁc inner-city neighborhoods. Risks will not be decreased with visioning
or general land-use proposals alone. The best plans identify which public
improvements will be made, where they will be located and when they will
become operational. Good graphics and visual representations of what the
neighborhood could become are important ingredients in changing attitudes about
places. Considerable political will is needed to implement speciﬁc small-area
plans, but jurisdictions that reduce risk and uncertainty in this way should be
rewarded with increased private investment. At the same time, local governments
should pursue strategic land banking to help ensure that asking prices for land in
locations earmarked for development do not skyrocket.
Second, although local politics usually results in resource allocations that spread
funds among neighborhoods, small-scale public investments that are dispersed
widely rarely reduce market risk. It is much more effective but politically difﬁcult
to concentrate resources in strategic locations and increase the size of projects in
order to achieve adequate scale. Redevelopment resembles an invasion that must
ﬁrst establish a beachhead in one location before it can spread to adjacent land.
Without adequate infrastructure and project scale, a beachhead cannot be
established. With success in one area, redevelopment should gradually become
self-sustaining as deals increase, information improves, conﬁdence intervals
narrow, risk goes down and values increase.
Third, certain areas may be too expensive to help, at least in the near-term, given
limited resources and the need to focus public investments spatially to achieve
adequate scale. In these areas, the objective should be to help existing residents474  Malizia
and businesses ﬁnd more viable locations. As harsh as this option may seem,
private investors will come to understand that the public sector intends to ignore
these areas for some period of time. Although asset values may decline, increased
certainty about the future of these areas should narrow the range of alternative
futures considerably. More certainty should provide a countervailing tendency that
may eventually lift asset values in these areas.
Fourth, the public sector can promote competition among developers and investors
if inner city markets, in fact, provide viable investment opportunities. Strategic
public investments and speciﬁc plans should increase the attractiveness of speciﬁc
sites and the value of property at locations where the market is strong. Currently,
most redevelopment opportunities exist in ‘‘buyers markets’’ where private
developers are scarce and are able to exact major concessions from the public in
return for buying sites and investing in redevelopment projects. Local jurisdictions
should try to make certain locations in inner-city areas sufﬁciently attractive to
create ‘‘sellers markets’’ where private developers are lining up to buy or option
sites in order to participate in the redevelopment process. This shift requires that
local governments have been able to target their attention and resources on a few,
key neighborhoods, rather than dispersing them throughout the entire city. The
competition among private developers should drive up asset values, make
redevelopment projects in the area more feasible, attract even more private
investment and create opportunities to recapture appreciating property values for
the beneﬁt of the community. As more private capital ﬂows to urban
redevelopment projects, community residents should realize more local services,
jobs, business opportunities and wealth creation.
All of these strategies are designed to reduce the uncertainty and risk involved in
urban redevelopment. The most signiﬁcant source of uncertainty is the wide range
of informed and uninformed opinions that exist concerning the redevelopment
potential of inner-city areas. Appraisers have difﬁculty valuing inner-city projects
accurately due to thin markets (few transactions). The absence of good
comparables increases the inﬂuence of opinions and other subjective factors.
Existing property owners who derive income from current land uses have a vested
interest in having an optimistic outlook on the long term. Developers may envision
viable uses for such sites but only if the properties can be secured in the near
term at reasonable prices. Investors usually have a wider range of assessments
about risk and uncertainty than developers or property owners. Some investors are
attracted to urban redevelopment projects whereas others have little interest in
them. Because transactions are infrequent and projects are complex, markedly
different investment outlooks may be justiﬁed for inner-city areas. Such
differences of opinion form a major barrier to attracting the resources needed for
redevelopment because they ultimately lower the value of potential projects. For
elaboration, see Luscht, 1997, Ch. 14–15.) The research results are presented
discursively in summary form in Exhibit 2.Structuring Urban Redevelopment Projects  475
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Exhibit 2  Summary of Results
 Public-private redevelopment projects that blend public and private sources of debt and equity
capital are expected to be economically viable, socially beneﬁcial and ﬁnancially feasible.
 All development projects are exposed to risks that arise throughout the development process,
especially entitlement risk, construction period risk and lease-up risk. Urban redevelopment
projects face additional challenges that increase project risk.
 Risk is higher for urban redevelopment projects than for similar projects in growing suburban
areas primarily for three reasons: market risk is perceived to be higher in inner-city areas than
in the suburbs; the capital budget is more difﬁcult to estimate for redevelopment sites
compared to greenﬁeld sites; and, most importantly, expectations of future conditions in inner-
city areas and distressed neighborhoods are more variable than expectations of future
suburban conditions.
 Real estate appraisers generally assign higher capitalization rates for proposed redevelopment
projects to reﬂect uncertainties associated with expectations of greater variance in future cash
ﬂows.
 Redevelopment projects are more difﬁcult to carry out than comparable suburban projects
because they are often marginal: they are estimated to have lower economic value but
relatively similar development costs.
 Lenders account for the higher risk of redevelopment projects compared to similar new
development projects by underwriting these projects in ways that result in higher debt-service
coverage ratios and/or lower loan-to-value ratios (or lower loan-to-cost ratios). More
conservative underwriting is required to compensate for higher risk.
 Lenders seek to lower market and ﬁnancial risk in three ways: by requiring pre-lease
agreements from anchor tenants and other major credit tenants or pre-sales to prospective
space users, by involving other sources of capital in redevelopment project ﬁnancing and by
calling on the expertise of their CDC subsidiary.
 Private investors consider urban redevelopment projects to be riskier than comparable new
projects in stronger suburban areas and therefore require higher returns to compensate for
higher risk.
 Private investors assess the return of capital as carefully as the return on capital and therefore
seek clear exit strategies and ways to reduce their holding period. After income-generating
projects have achieved stabilized operations, they can be reﬁnanced or sold to return some or
all of the capital to equity investors.
 Private investors consider lower leverage on urban redevelopment projects, which lowers the
lender’s ﬁnancial risk, as a disadvantage, since proportionately more equity is required. For
any given amount of risk capital, more equity invested per project implies less diversiﬁcation
because fewer projects can be funded.
 Because equity investors have relatively high cash-on-cash return requirements and lenders
provide debt at relatively low loan-to-value ratios, the resulting capitalization rates for urban
redevelopment projects can be signiﬁcantly higher than similar greenﬁeld projects. Actions by
community-based organizations and the public sector that lower the perceived risks of urban
redevelopment should lower equity return requirements and increase the availability of private
ﬁnancing. Appraisers would then use lower capitalization rates, and the appraised value of
redevelopment projects would increase.476  Malizia
Exhibit 2  (continued)
Summary of Results
 Public subsidies, debt ﬁnancing from public agencies and CDFIs, equity infusions from CDCs,
and federal or state guarantees are used to make risky projects doable. Federal tax-credit
programs increase after-tax returns. Local governments have also rented project space or have
helped project owners lease space to major tenants to lower risk.
 The gap-ﬁnancing model has been used to bring commercial lenders to the table by lowering
the project’s ﬁnancial risk to them, but in doing so, the public often receives very minimal
ﬁnancial compensation for the debt capital provided. Instead of offering some given amount or
percentage of gap ﬁnancing a priori, private risks and returns should be carefully assessed to
provide just enough ﬁnancial incentive but not more than necessary.
 One approach to increase value recapture for the existing community is to develop small-area
plans that identify a series of redevelopment opportunities. The subsidy levels in the early
projects may be substantial, but, as the beneﬁts of successful initial projects are realized,
increasingly remunerative positions for the community may be secured in later-stage projects.
 Local public policy can mitigate uncertainty. Although considerable political will is required,
local governments can set out clear priorities and plans that target certain areas for
development or service improvements. Equally important is the need to identify low priority
areas. With consistent implementation over time, developers, landowners, investors and lenders
will understand in which areas and roughly when public investments will occur. This
information should make expectations more consistent and reduce valuation differences in all
areas. As a result, private investment may be more likely in the low-priority areas as well as in
those areas targeted for redevelopment in the near term.
 Central city jurisdictions can lower market and ﬁnancial risk in distressed neighborhoods by
developing and steadfastly implementing small-area revitalization plans, improving
infrastructure selectively, increasing project scale, clustering development around strong
neighborhood anchors, using triage when necessary and promoting competition. Local
governments and CDCs also can improve the chances of successful revitalization by organizing
and involving neighborhood stakeholders early in the process.
 Local government can reduce development costs through land banking of strategic sites
identiﬁed in the small-area planning process. These properties will not be subjected to
speculative pressures when subsequently slated for redevelopment.
 The public and private participants in urban redevelopment projects should fully discuss project
objectives, site plan and design, community involvement, government approvals, construction
options, leasing strategies, ﬁnancing sources and related topics. The participants should discuss
openly their perceptions of market and ﬁnancial risk and the related return requirements. All
parties should beneﬁt from a more transparent process. More private capital should ﬂow to
better-designed urban redevelopment projects.
The Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond has published a research report on this work. See Malizia
and Accordino, 2001.Structuring Urban Redevelopment Projects  477
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 Conclusion
This qualitative research has generated useful information for project participants,
and the ﬁndings should be used to inform current public-private redevelopment
efforts. Examining central cities that implement some of the strategies
recommended above could lend support to them, suggest ways to ﬁne-tune them,
or indicate their limitations, especially in overcoming the constraints of weak
inner-city markets.
The valuation challenges associated with urban redevelopment projects are a
special case of the general challenge of valuing relatively unique and risky
projects. Research on how to assess market and ﬁnancial risk for brownﬁeld
projects, urban inﬁll projects, mixed-use projects and other projects advancing the
principles of smart growth should generate relevant results for valuing urban
redevelopment projects.
Finally, future research should focus on ways to attract more debt and equity
capital to urban redevelopment projects, especially from private equity sources
that have opted to remain uninvolved to date.
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